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A house full of weather and a polar bear costume. These are things that have the potential to create effects: effects on humans and the world at large. A house full of weather and a polar bear costume are things that question the binary divisions between human/non-human and nature/culture. They are the material of performance, active things that have ‘thing-power: the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle’ (Bennett 2010: 6). In other words, they have the capacity for agency. These performances, Fevered Sleep’s The Weather Factory (2010) and It’s the Skin You’re Living In (2012), enact and reveal the human--non-human assemblages and interconnections that make up the ecologically material world.[{note}]1 They are ecological because they highlight and critique our relationship to ecological conditions such as global climate change. These performances, I will suggest, gesture towards a non-anthropocentric performance aesthetic,[{note}]2 decentring the human through what I will term ecological anthropomorphism.
The current ecological context has prompted resurgence in debate over the concept of ‘humanness’. Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, has argued for a reconception of our understanding of humans as geophysical forces, to recognize the influence of humans on the physical and geological processes of the Earth (2012). ‘Humans, collectively’, Chakrabarty writes, ‘now have an agency in determining the climate of the planet as a whole, a privilege reserved in the past only for very large-scale geophysical forces’ (9). The anthropogenic effect on the climate is profound and this influence has been termed the age of the Anthropocene, the geological period of the human. What does this reconfiguration of the human do then to the supposedly humanist discipline of theatre and performance? 
In the following, I will suggest a way of thinking about performance that resists anthropocentrism through recognition of the material agency of the more-than-human.[{note}]3 I set forth an argument that in the current ecological age of the Anthropocene, a non-anthropocentric aesthetic of performance and theatre may help contribute to what Jane Bennett calls an ‘ecological sensibility’ (2010). One of the ways it may do this is through what I term ‘ecological anthropomorphism’. This is anthropomorphism that disrupts the anthropocentric hierarchy through recognition of the capacity for agency and action in the more-than-human and questions binary-making practices. Ecological anthropomorphism not only reveals the way the more-than-human shares qualities with the human, it also shapes human action. As Bruno Latour contends, anthropomorphizing is not only attributing human characteristics to the non-human, it also ‘gives shape to humans’ (2009: 160). Philosopher Karen Barad argues that nature enacts a queer performativity that radically disrupts ontological distinctions between human and ‘other’ (2012). I consider queer ecology well placed to problematize and disrupt the configuration of human/non-human in a dichotomous relationship. Fevered Sleep’s It’s the Skin You’re Living In, a film following a man in a polar bear costume as he walks from the Arctic to the city, illustrates this disruption by enacting an ecological anthropomorphism. It acknowledges the interconnections between human--animal--climate, troubling distinctions and boundaries between them. Given Latour’s conception of anthropomorphism, Chakrabarty’s assertion of humans as geological forces is a description of that which human’s shape and that which gives shape to the human (2012). The performance installation of The Weather Factory, in which different weather conditions were installed in a residential home near Snowdonia, Wales, reveals the way the weather shapes human action and identity and the way humans shape the climate.[{note}]4 A house full of weather is an affective metaphor that appeals to human capacity to understand the geophysical influence of human agency in the current ecological age. I then suggest that ecological anthropomorphism is the capacity for action/agency to shape and be shaped by the human, recognizing the problematic ecological effects of drawing fixed boundaries between the human/non-human and nature/culture.

{a}A non-anthropocentric performance aesthetic

If the current state of the climate creates an imperative to turn towards the ecological in all disciplines (Chaudhuri 1994), then a non-anthropocentric aesthetic of performance is needed, one that acknowledges the geological agency of the human and the effective agency of the more-than-human. Taking Bennett’s concept of vital materialism as a starting point (2010), I suggest that performance can open up new ways of thinking about ‘humanness’ and ‘performance’, rethinking reductive binary-making practices through an ecological anthropomorphism. Bennett contends that our current conception of the non-human as inanimate or instrumental hinders us from engaging with the range of sensible forces, actants and agents that operate in relation to us and obstructs the development of a more ecological sensibility. In Vibrant Matter she argues that all matter has life or vibrancy and recognition of this vibrancy may change our relationship to the world and underpin an ecological ethic. If we consider all matter as having agency in some sense, the distinctions between ‘human’ and ‘nature’ are put into question. She further proposes that the anthropomorphizing of the distributive agency of the more-than-human may actually break apart perceived categorical distinctions and reveal isomorphisms or similar relations: ‘we need to cultivate a bit of anthropomorphism -- the idea that human agency has some echoes in nonhuman nature -- to counter the narcissism of humans in charge of the world’ (Bennett 2010: xvi). 
The beginning of the anthropocentric hierarchy, which separates humans from nature, can be traced back to the Great Chain of Being or scala naturae (Soper 1995). The centring of the human at the apex of life (just below God and other celestial beings) informed a broadly Western view of the natural world as a resource for man. I suggest thinking through the agency of human--non-human assemblages is needed to counter anthropocentric egoism that has lead to unprecedented environmental change. Instead of a vertical chain of being, vital materialism proposes a horizontality of distributive agency, which reconfigures historic anthropocentrism and recognizes the ecological materiality of the more-than-human.
How then do we think through distributive more-than-human agency within an aesthetic of theatre and performance? Vital materialism calls for recognition of the way the more-than-human creates effects: ‘We are vital materiality and we are surrounded by it, though we do not always see it that way. The ethical task at hand here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it’ (Bennett 2010: 14).
To theorize performance work through a vital materialism is necessarily to decentre the human and to become open to the material agency of the more-than-human actants involved, resisting anthropocentrism.




Bennett draws on Darwin’s fascination with worms, and their essentialness to human life, to illustrate the way anthropomorphism need not be fatal to an ecological project. Worms are what Darwin refers to as ‘small agencies’ that, ‘when in the right confederation with other physical and physiological bodies, can make big things happen’ (Bennett 2010: 94). Darwin studied worms and came to the conclusion that through the production of topsoil (or vegetable mould) they play an important part in the ecosystem and in human history. The topsoil produced by worm castings not only creates fertile ground for growing of crops, but the worms’ continual process of depositing their castings means that they also cover any objects deposited in the earth with protective topsoil. For this cultural preservation ‘archaeologists ought to be grateful to worms’ (Darwin (1881) in Bennett 2010: 96). Worms, then, are not only vital for food growing, but they also have a profound influence on how we understand human history. Worms enact a distributed agency within heterogeneous assemblages with humans and more-than-human agents. For Darwin, worms display ‘a presence of mind’ that corresponds to adaptability to specific situations rather than reflexive action, and ‘act in nearly the same manner as would man’ (96). It was through this anthropomorphism of worms that Darwin began to pay closer attention to them and discover their complex relationship to human life. 
The philosophical rejection of anthropomorphism is often related to the hubristic idea of the unique agency of humans, claims Bennett. She suggests that anthropomorphism can reveal isomorphisms (corresponding relations or forms) and reconfigure the relationship horizontally, recognizing the capacity for agency of more-than-human actants. This is not to say that all things have the same kind of agency or to project a totalling sameness, rather to question the fixity and hierarchy of distinctions between the human and the more-than-human, nature and culture. ‘In a vital materialism’, Bennett writes, ‘an anthropomorphic element in perception can uncover a whole world of resonances and resemblances -- sounds and sights that echo and bounce far more than would be possible were the universe to have a hierarchical structure’ (2010: 99). This is not to say that there are no differences between humans and the more-the-human, rather to question and critique the practices of divisions that position humans as the only beings with the capacity for agency/action.
Barad also contends that anthropomorphizing can disrupt anthropocentrism and open up a space for more-than-human possibilities (2012). She advocates anthropomorphizing to resist anthropocentrism ‘where the human in its exceptional way of being gets to hold all the “goodies” like agency, intentionality, rationality, feeling, pain, empathy, language, consciousness, imagination, and much more’ (27). She departs from Bennett though in that she is not suggesting strategic anthropomorphism per se, rather she is ‘interested in troubling the assumptions that prop up the anthropos in the first place, including the assumed separation between “the human” and its others’ (27). Using what she refers to as the ‘anthropomorphic moment’, she contends that it can create a space to question the presumptions of anthropocentrism rather than reinforce ‘habits of projection’ (27). The anthropomorphic moment, then, may open up the possibility of decentring the human by problematizing the binary distinctions between human and the more-than-human. 

{a}A polar bear costume

The Fevered Sleep film It’s the Skin You’re Living In is an example of an anthropomorphic moment, which enacts an ecological anthropomorphism by reframing images of climate change to reveal the interconnectedness between humans and the more-than-human. The film takes the iconic mascot of climate change, the polar bear, and explores its connection to the human and ideas of home. A man dressed in a polar bear costume walks from the Arctic to a city, travelling across motorways and countryside in different states of undress of the polar bear costume, before arriving at his house having fully shed the costume, but not the disease of the experience, and going about everyday life. 
[{figure 1}]
The film was developed through conversations between David Harradine (Fevered Sleep artistic director) and Julie Doyle, a researcher in media studies and climate change. She contends that the climate change images of polar bears and melting glaciers circulating in the mass media actually distance people from climate change, making it seem a ‘distant and future threat’ rather than a current reality (2012: 2). The anthropomorphizing in the film reminds us of how interconnected we are to the more-than-human and the way in which climate change implicates us all: from the clothes we wear to the food we eat, these things are all embedded in various ecological relationships. The film, in a sense, restates the species boundary, the interface between animal and human (and therefore, perhaps, nature and culture), suggesting porosity between the two. In the film, the boundary between man and polar bear is not clear; the polar bear and human are brought into the same dimension, challenging what Tim Ingold refers to as: ‘the Western view of the uniqueness of the human species … personhood as a state of being is not open to non-human animal kinds’ (2000: 48). Within vital materialism, if we perceive the more-than-human as similar to us, having agency, rather than a distanced other, we may start to perceive these isomorphisms and uncanny assemblages of congruities and parallels. This perception may then lead in turn to an ecological sensibility that acknowledges the ecological interdependence with the more-than-human.
The film creates a jarring effect that enacts a dislocation while simultaneously revealing interconnectedness. The man is not quite fully human because of the polar bear costume, and the bear is not really a bear because it is in an incomplete state, attached to a man. While the human remains at the centre of the film, he begins in the Arctic, alone, out of place, and it is not immediately clear that it is a man and not an actual polar bear. The clinging of the costume to the man as he travels reflects the way in which the polar bear (or the more-than-human) cannot be discarded, distanced or forgotten. The film uses a split screen to juxtapose images of the man-bear and the landscape, reading them horizontally.[{note}]5 The image of the skin of the man and the costume skin of the polar bear is a visualization of Morton’s conception of the similarity of all life, or as he writes: ‘we have others -- rather, others have us -- literally under our skin’ (2010: 274). The polar bear has a man under his skin, a metaphor perhaps for the anthropogenic influence on global climate change. 
Of course there are risks with anthropomorphizing the more-than-human: reinforcing the narcissistic gaze of the human while defining the more-than-human through human-like qualities and characteristics. In some instances, anthropomorphism may not problematize the differentiating practices that separate human from non-human per se, and instead elevate a particular species or thing to a ‘human-like’ status. Anthropologist Niels Einarsson has argued this is evident in some environmentalist ‘save the whales’ campaigns (1993). Instead of acknowledging the reductive binary thinking that relegates whales to a status below the human, these campaigns anthropomorphize the whale as a special and unique species deserving of human compassion and pardon from hunting. The whale is elevated above other animals, particularly other sea-based animals that are consumed as part of the diet of the Global North. In this way, the whale gains a moral defence, making their killing unpopular whatever the method or circumstances, while other animals are not afforded this defence (Einarsson 1993). The film then runs the risk of anthropomorphizing the polar bear to the extent that it gains a moral high ground without critiquing the very practices that differentiate it from the ‘human’. However, the image of the polar bear presented troubles the popularized images of polar bears in the media by dismantling the bear to only its ‘skin’. There was a notable absence of ‘actual’ polar bears in the film.
Bennett also identifies superstition, the divination of nature and romanticism as further risks of anthropomorphization. It may be that the projection of human qualities on the more-than-human is a return to a pre-Enlightenment divination. Unqualified anthropomorphization may not be useful to an ecological sensibility in performance, rather an anthropomorphism that goes beyond the narcissistic human gaze to recognize the material complexity of the more-than-human and resists the bifurcation of human/nature and nature/culture. As Bennett contends: 

Maybe it is worth running the risks associated with anthropomorphising (superstition, the divination of nature, romanticism) because it, oddly enough, works against anthropocentrism: a chord is struck between person and thing, and I am no longer above or outside a nonhuman ‘environment’. 
(2010: 120)





For Latour, anthropomorphization is not only about thinking the non-human through characteristics of the human, it also shapes human action (2009). Latour draws on the etymology of the word, anthropos, meaning human, and morphos, meaning shape: ‘anthropos and morphos together mean either that which has human shape or that which gives shape to humans’ (160). The anthropomorphic can be that which structures and influences human action or, in other words, has material agency. The capacity for agency then of the more-than-human can shape the actions of the human. Climate change, for example, shapes human action through extreme weather conditions, through floods and droughts and their resulting material effects on things like food, shelter, health, transportation and migration. Weather should not be conflated with climate (or climate change) as it is a more localized and temporary symptom of larger climatic conditions. The melting glaciers of the Arctic, as It’s the Skin You’re Living In illustrates, shape the action of humans and more-than-humans, not least by driving polar bears to residential areas and forcing more interaction with humans.




Queer ecology similarly points to categorical distinctions as an obstacle to ecological thinking. Timothy Morton argues for a non-essentialist viewpoint in parallel to queer theory, contending that ‘biology shows us that there is no authentic life-form’, in his project of queering of ecological criticism (2010: 275). There is no normative idea of nature as animals, cells, amoebas and others do not act/reproduce/perform in normative ways. Difference and diversity are ecological principles of a healthy ecosystem. Morton also suggests a type of anthropomorphizing by contending that ‘every life-form is familiar, since we are related to it. We share its DNA, its cell structure, the subroutines in the software of its brain’ (277). The idea of cells being familiar resonates with one of Bennett’s projections of vital materialism, which is ‘a more refined sensitivity to the outside-that-is-inside-too’, so that ‘maybe a bit of anthropomorphising will prove valuable’ (2010: 120). Bennett points to the body as material, yet material that is ‘not fully or exclusively human’ (112). On a cellular or bacterial level, not only are we in a world of vital matter but we have actants and agents on and inside our bodies, thereby problematizing the idea of an ‘exclusively human’ body. 




If to anthropomorphize is to shape the human, we must also recognize the way in which humans exercise non-human agency. Chakrabarty’s position of reconsidering ‘the figure of the human in the age of the Anthropocene, the era when humans act as a geological force on the planet, changing its climate for millennia to come’ needs to be taken into account (2012: 2). Chakrabarty contends that this figure of the human as geophysical force draws an analogy to more-than-human agency. Chaudhuri and Enelow identify this as ‘geological agency, which operates on a scale that not only defies the imagination but also defeats the methods and modes of humanist inquiry’ (2014: 25). Chakrabarty’s conception of the human then already implicates the more-than-human in a way that seems difficult for humans to conceive. ‘The current conjuncture of globalisation and global warming’, Chakrabarty writes, ‘leaves us with the challenge of having to think of human agency over multiple and incommensurable scales at once’ (2012: 1).[{note}]6 Performance may be one way we are able to think through this reconfiguration of the human (and the more-than-human). 
Chakrabarty contends that humans are not able to ‘really imagine beyond a couple of generations before and after their own time’, making it difficult to understand the full impact of their material and ecological agency (12). Chakrabarty points to art as a way to bring the abstract concept for climate change to a recognizable scale for humans. Artworks can ‘extend our understanding to those who in future may suffer the impact of the geophysical force that is the human’ (12). A house full of weather and a polar bear costume, framed in performance, can help us understand the relational ecological effects of both human and more-than-human agency. 

{a}A house full of weather

Fevered Sleep’s The Weather Factory is an example of the way in which performance enacts the imaginative possibility of geological agency on a human scale, at once anthropomorphizing the weather but also disrupting binaries between humans/nature and indoor/outdoor. During the inaugural season of National Theatre Wales, a theatre without walls, Fevered Sleep created a performance installation within a house in Penygroes, Wales, near Snowdonia. Small groups of audience members explored the house, which was full of weather and instruments and archives relating to the measurement of weather. There was a bathroom covered with growing moss, a basement in which it was raining, a room full of wind, one full of mist, light and an installation of televisions playing shifting cloudscapes. Wandering freely through the house, audience members experienced different weather conditions, measurements and documentation based on the weather of the local area. Director David Harradine interviewed local residents about the weather in north Wales for the piece, described in the following way on the company website:

The project played with ideas that ‘the weather’ is not only a natural phenomenon -- an effect of the relationships between the sea, the sun and the landscape -- but also a human drama, a way for us to talk about ourselves and the places in which we live. 
(Fevered Sleep 2010)

By bringing the weather indoors, humans are implicated in a relationship with the weather, demonstrating how they may shape it. The interrelatedness of elements is revealed in an affective way, simultaneously disrupting the domestic sphere and displacing the indoor/outdoor binary. The image of a house full of different weather conditions is a metaphor for the way in which humans are affecting and shaping the climate and geological age. ‘Human drama’ in this instance is also more-than-human drama as human agency has extended to the atmosphere and biosphere. By naming the weather as human drama, the performance of natural elements is anthropomorphized to reveal the way in which it is interconnected to the construction of identity and place making. If the weather is a way of talking 'about ourselves and the place in which we live’, it extends the idea of what it means to be human to an atmospheric scale. To be human is to shape the weather and climate and be shaped by it. Chakrabarty argues for a certain type of anthropomorphism, contending that in order to imagine and understand the scale of human agency in the Anthropocene, we must ‘appeal to human experience’ (2012: 11). It is through 'the metaphoric capacity of human language and visual records’ to comprehend the scale of the capacity of the human as a geophysical force (11). By ‘installing’ weather in the domestic, human home, The Weather Factory appeals to this metaphoric capacity in order to understand the way in which the material agency of the human is changing not only our house or the place where we live, but our home in the larger planetary sense. 
[{figure 2}]
These Fevered Sleep performances point to the ecologically material agency of the more-than-human that can be read as reconfiguring human and more-than-human relations away from hierarchical verticality. Bennett writes of this reconfiguration:

Materiality is a rubric that tends to horizontalize the relations between humans, biota, and abiota. It draws human attention sideways, away from an ontologically ranked Great Chain of Being and toward a greater appreciation of the complex entanglements of humans and nonhumans. 
(2010: 112)

We are like the weather and a polar bear as we create material effects and act on/with each other in dynamic relationships of ecology.

{a}Conclusion: Towards ecological performance





1 Fevered Sleep (2012) It’s the Skin You’re Living In, http://www.feveredsleep.co.uk/films/its-the-skin-youre-living-in/ (​http:​/​​/​www.feveredsleep.co.uk​/​films​/​its-the-skin-youre-living-in​/​​) (accessed on 5 October 2014). The Weather Factory took place in 2010 in Penygroes, Wales, National Theatre Wales.
2 This is of course a performative self-contradiction, a human elaborating a non-anthropocentric performance aesthetic, as Bennett identifies in Vibrant Matter (2010).
3 ‘More-than-human’ is a term from David Abram (1997) used here to resist reinforcing the binary between human and non-human.
4 Weather is not climate, as ‘climate is a pattern of weather demonstrated over time, so no single storm or heat wave can be ascribed to climate change’ (Trexler 2014: 205).
5 The film is also a multi-user app that splits the film across the screens of multiple mobile phones. 
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Figure 1. It’s the Skin You're Living In, Fevered Sleep, 2012. Film still David Harradine (director), courtesy of Fevered Sleep.

Figure 2. The Weather Factory, Fevered Sleep / National Theatre Wales, 2010. Photo by Jorge Lizalde, courtesy of Fevered Sleep.
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